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The beneficiaries of technology adoption in agriculture and biofuels markets in the United 
States are heavily influenced by domestic biofuel policies and market context. Biofuel 
mandates, one of the key pillars of domestic biofuel policies, may significantly alter the 
elasticity of demand for biofuels as well as the derived demand for maize used to produce a 
significant share of ethanol in the United States. Using a stochastic agriculture and biofuels 
model, we assess how the introduction of technology may affect the crops and biofuel 
markets under binding and non-binding biofuel mandates and discuss the implications for 
analysis of EU biofuel policies. 
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Missouri INTRODUCTION 
In his analysis of post-war American farm policy, Cochrane outlined four aspects of 
American society that intersected to create the curse of American agricultural abundance: the 
emphasis on technological solutions, the competitive market place, extremely inelastic 
demand for the farmer’s output and the inability of resources and capital to shift to other 
more profitable uses (Cochrane and Ryan 1976). Unimpeded, these forces conspire to push 
supplies out against an inelastic demand, setting producers on an agricultural ‘treadmill’ 
forcing prices lower (Cochrane 1958). Agricultural policies of the period sought to raise and 
stabilize income in the context of growing supplies, ensuring further investment in 
technology and inevitably consolidation and structural change in American agriculture.  
 
The subject of technology adoption within agriculture continues to garner significant 
attention and has been the subject of ongoing reviews of methodology and usage in the 
literature (Feder et al. 1985, Feder and Umali 1993, Sundig and Zilberman 2001). Cochrane’s 
treadmill continued to operate seemingly unimpeded through the year 2004 as real crop 
prices continued to fall and production consolidated into fewer and fewer farm operations. 
Concerns of excess crop supplies have faded, at least for the moment, but policies are again 
playing a significant role in how technology adoption affects market prices and behavior in 
both crop and renewable energy markets.  
 
At least until recently the U.S. maize market was often considered to conform to Cochrane’s 
depiction of a typical agricultural commodity market.  Much of the demand for maize was 
thought to be inelastic. A supply shift, through technology improvements, would result in 
substantive price changes with only modest increases in the quantity consumed (figure 1). 
While producers may see little benefit from technological progress, the users of maize such 
as livestock producers and consumers, both foreign and domestic, would see the majority of 
the benefits. If demand for maize were to become more elastic, producers would retain a 
greater share of the benefits. 
   
As the biofuel industry began its rapid expansion in 2005, much was made of the tightening 
linkage between energy and agricultural markets. Demand for ethanol was expected to be 
very sensitive to the relative prices of gasoline and ethanol, and the supply of ethanol was expected to be very sensitive to relative prices of maize and ethanol. Thus, the prices of 
petroleum, ethanol and maize would be closely tied (Tyner and Taheripour 2008). With the 
significant increase in the share of maize being used in the production of ethanol, the 
implication was a slowing of Cochrane’s treadmill. Ethanol production would both raise 
maize prices and provide the elasticity in demand that would lead to the benefits of 
technology adoption accruing to producers at last.  
  
Biofuels markets in the United States are heavily influenced by public policy.  Use of ethanol 
is subsidized by means of a blender’s credit, which provides a tax credit to fuel suppliers who 
blend ethanol into the fuel they sell. Biodiesel has also been subsidized using a similar 
mechanism. Ethanol imports are discouraged by a significant tariff on product imported 
directly from Brazil, the main supplier in world markets. Finally, the Energy Independence 
and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 created a set of mandates requiring the use of at least 
specific quantities of different classes of biofuels.  The blender’s credit acts as a simple shift 
in demand, while the behavior of the mandate is more complex. 
 
The demand for biofuel feedstocks and the demand elasticity faced by biofuel producers are 
highly dependent on domestic biofuel policies, and the relative importance of these individual 
policies has been shown to be highly context dependent (Meyer et al., 2009). The mandates 
introduced by EISA may, under certain circumstances, significantly reduce the demand 
elasticity for biofuels and thus the short run profitability gained by technology adopters. 
 
The mandates represent volumetric quantities which the blenders are obligated to sell into the 
retail market. These requirements may be largely irrelevant, such as in the case where 
petroleum prices are extremely high relative to feedstock prices and the demand for ethanol 
in the marketplace exceeds the mandated quantities. Alternatively when the market would 
otherwise choose a quantity of ethanol below the mandate, it becomes binding and 
determines the quantity demanded in the biofuel marketplace. It is then probable that there 
are different elasticities of demand for maize over different demand quantities (figure 2). 
Demand for maize used in biofuel is a derived demand. When the mandate is binding, shifts 
in the supply from factors such as improved maize yields (ES1 to ES2), may simply result in a reduction in prices (P1 to P2) as the biofuel portion of demand remains at mandate levels 
(Q1,2).  
 
If the mandates are not binding, the shift in supply (ES3 to ES4) results in a greater quantity 
change (Q3 to Q4) and a much smaller reduction in prices (P3 to P4), allowing maize 
producers to retain a greater share in the benefits of technology adoption such as improved 
crop yields. Technology adoption directly by the biofuel producers can be similarly affected 
if we now consider figure 2 to represent the wholesale market for biofuels. In this case it is 
technology that shifts out the supply of ethanol from producers (ES1 to ES2 and ES3 to ES4) 
with effects on biofuel prices and quantities depending on where market demand is relative to 
the mandate. When mandates are binding, biofuel producers face a highly inelastic demand 
and the benefits of technology adoption in the biofuel processing sector would flow to biofuel 
consumers.  
 
Technology improvements in the processing sector may have positive or negative effects in 
the feedstock sector (figure 3). The quantity of maize or other feedstocks used in ethanol 
production may increase if new technologies make ethanol production more profitable and if 
ethanol demand is sufficiently elastic (D1 to D2). Feedstock use may actually fall if the 
mandate is binding and the technology improvement improves extraction rates versus a pure 
cost reduction. Biofuel demand remains constrained at the mandated levels, but the quantities 
of feedstocks necessary to produce that quantity is less after the improvement in extraction 
rates. Should the technology improvement occur through extraction rates, there would be a 
shift inward of the vertical portion of the demand curve represented by the mandate.  
 
Using a stochastic model of agricultural and biofuel markets, we can examine the effects of 
technology adoption by both feedstock producers and biofuel producers on their respective 
markets. In one case maize yields are increased from their baseline levels and in another 
ethanol extraction rates by producers are improved.  
THE MODEL 
The model used is a non-spatial partial equilibrium stochastic model of domestic crops, 
livestock and liquid biofuels markets. The model is closely related to the deterministic model used by FAPRI for the production of its annual baseline process, and is aligned to a common 
baseline (FAPRI 2010). The stochastic approach has value when there is an interest in the 
possible distribution of market outcomes.  It is also valuable when policies or other market 
characteristics introduce important asymmetries (Binfield, et al., 2002). For example, a 
stochastic model is better suited to estimate government expenditures when policies only 
make payments when prices fall below trigger levels. These models have a long history of 
use in the analysis of agricultural policy (for example, Westhoff et al., 2008, FAPRI 2005, 
FAPRI 2000 ) and the market representation required for policy analysis makes it suitable for 
an industry wide analysis of the effect of structural or technological change under those 
policies. 
 
The stochastic approach introduces uncertainty in exogenous variables and allows for market 
analysis over a wide range of conditions. The exogenous variables or error terms drawn on 
come from six basic areas: crop yields per unit of land, milk production per cow, exogenous 
energy and cost variables, domestic demand, domestic stockholding and reduced form 
equations for the rest of the world represented through trade equations. The stochastic draws 
maintain historic correlations within the six groupings, where the segmentation into these 
groupings is to ensure proper correlation among related variables and avoid spurious 
correlations which may arise between unrelated variable groupings. The draws on the 
variables are used to create 500 sets of 10-year correlated draws, which are then used to 
simulate the model (Westhoff et al., 2006). 
 
The increasing importance of energy in agricultural markets has driven recent model 
developments. The model incorporates the EISA use mandates, as well as provisions of other 
legislation related to the blender’s tax credits and ethanol tariffs. The behavior of the 
mandates with their nested requirements is a significant source of complexity within the 
legislation but one which requires correct representation to understand the effects of other 
policies and external shocks on agricultural markets (Thompson et al., 2009). Policies, the 
credits and mandates, differentiate biofuels by type, ethanol versus bio-based diesel, as well 
as by feedstock and biofuel conversion process, all of which receives a representation in the 
model (see Thompson et al., 2008 for a partial representation). 
 The model explicitly represents both investment decisions related to biofuel production 
capacity and the decision to utilize existing capacity. This imposes short run constraints on 
ethanol production that are more apparent in a stochastic analysis. Likewise, the ability to 
utilize a product like E-85 (a blend of up to 85 percent ethanol) in motor vehicles depends on 
investment decisions by fuel sellers and consumers that are also incorporated in the model.  
RENEWABLE IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS (RINS) 
When a mandate is binding, the fuel blenders must bid up the supplier price of biofuel to 
obtain the needed quantities to meet their obligations. However, at the same time, fuel sellers 
must offer blended fuel at a price that consumers are willing to pay (Meyer and Thompson 
2009). When mandates are binding, the price they can charge for blended fuel does not fully 
reflect the costs of the ethanol incorporated in the fuel. Instead, fuel merchandisers are forced 
to accept lower profits or pass along this cost to all fuel consumers, not just consumers of 
blended fuels. It is this cost that becomes the RIN value (Thompson et al., 2009).  
 
The RIN, or renewable identification number, is the system by which the obligated parties 
show their compliance with the EISA mandates. The blender must show the volume of RINs 
necessary to meet their assigned obligation each year. These RINs are tradable and thus the 
price of the RIN is bid up to the point where the blender is indifferent between buying the 
ethanol at a high price and selling it at a lower price into a blend or simply purchasing RIN 
from another obligated party. Blenders can generate RINs to sell by incorporating more of 
one of the four classes of biofuels in the fuel they merchandise than the quantity they are 
required to use under the mandates. Blenders in areas with high ethanol costs or limited 
distribution infrastructure and markets for E85 use may find it less expensive to purchase 
RINs from other blenders rather than blend themselves.  
 
The value of the RIN therefore provides us with a measure of just how ‘binding’ the 
mandates are. High RIN values indicate a significant effect of the mandate on the quantities 
blended where a lower value suggests a small effect. Other than transaction costs and 
speculative RIN holding to meet the subsequent year’s mandate requirements, RINs have no 
value when the market is willing to use more biofuels than required by the EISA mandates. 
The total value of the RINs used for compliance in the year for each mandate, conventional, advanced and bio-based diesel, is a measure of the costs borne by the consumer of enforcing 
the mandates.  
 
Under EISA, there are specific mandates for the use of cellulosic biofuels and rules that are 
distinct from those that apply to other classes of biofuel. It is widely assumed that the 
cellulosic ethanol mandate will be waived each year because production capacity will be 
inadequate to satisfy the legislated mandate, as explicitly allowed under EISA. When the 
mandate is waived, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), enforcers of the mandate, 
must offer compliance cellulosic RINs at a legislated allowance value.
4 The EPA must then 
set a lower mandate which is attainable based upon their estimate of industry capacity. 
Therefore cellulosic ethanol production is unconstrained within the context of this analysis 
and the RIN price for cellulosic ethanol takes on the allowance value. 
INCREASING YIELDS 
The first scenario is intended to examine the consequences of technology growth in the 
feedstock sector.  The maize trend yield is increased by adding 0.13 metric tons per hectare (2 
bushels an acre) to the annual growth rate assumed in the baseline from 2011 to 2019, 
resulting in a 1.13 metric ton per hectare upward shift in yields in the year 2019 (figure 4). 
Table 1a shows the average effects of the increased crop yields over the 2015 to 2019 crop 
years relative to the 2010 FAPRI stochastic baseline for all 500 simulations. Results show 
that as yields increase, maize production increases, resulting in lower maize prices.  
 
Lower maize prices result in higher maize consumption. More maize is fed to animals and 
more is exported. Lower maize prices also make ethanol production more profitable, so 
ethanol use of maize also increases.  Overall demand is inelastic, so corn prices fall by a 
larger proportion than the increase in yields. The resulting reduction in net returns to maize 
production per hectare results in a reduction in the area devoted to maize production and an 
increase in the area devoted to competing crops. Increased production and cross-price effects 
                                                           
4 The allocation price is set at the greater of $0.79 per litter minus the wholesale unleaded gasoline price or 
$0.066 per litre, the credit is indexed to inflation after 2010. in demand result in lower prices for wheat, soybeans and other competing crops. Overall crop 
area declines and is consistent with the decline in net returns to crop production.
5   
 
Table 1b shows the effects of the yield increase in the ethanol market and on aggregate 
measures related to biofuel and agriculture markets. Ethanol production increases by over 3 
billion litres coming primarily from expansion of maize-based ethanol. There is some 
reduction in ethanol imports but it is small in comparison with the increases in domestic 
production.
6  The increase in ethanol supplies results in lower ethanol prices, and average 
consumption levels increase. 
 
As Cochrane would have expected, the increase in maize yields leads to a reduction in net 
farm income. Crop receipts fall, as the increase in production is more than outweighed by 
lower prices.  Livestock producers experience reduced feed costs, and so benefit. However, 
the resulting supply response results in lower livestock prices that moderate the increase in 
livestock producer net profits.  Land rental costs and other production expenses decline, but 
not enough to offset the decline in receipts, so net farm income falls. Lower prices slightly 
increase government expenditures on farm programs funded by the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC). , The increase is very small however, because market prices are 
generally above the levels that would trigger support under current U.S. farm policies.
7 
   
Consumers are the primary beneficiaries under the scenario, as total U.S. food expenditures 
fall by an average of 3 billion dollars a year relative to the baseline from 2015 to 2019. The 
value of the conventional RIN falls as the increased maize yields increase supplies and reduce 
prices, making the mandate less binding and lowering the average RIN value. The lowering 
                                                           
5 The crop and land areas tracked in the model include: maize, soybeans, wheat, upland cotton, sorghum, barley 
, oats, rice, sunflower seed, peanuts, canola, sugar beets, sugarcane, hay, conservation reserve, double cropped 
area and switchgrass.  
6 EISA establishes a submandate for “advanced biofuels,” and sugar-based ethanol qualifies under this mandate. 
Most baseline ethanol imports are intended to satisfy this mandate, but in some stochastic solutions, additional 
imports occur when U.S. ethanol prices in the conventional market rise high enough relative to Brazilian market 
prices that they cover the tariff and transportation costs.  
7 Price-based subsidies for grains and oilseeds only occur in a small fraction of the stochastic outcomes, even 
when average prices decline slightly from baseline levels. Under a different market situation that resulted in 
substantially lower baseline prices, the decline in prices resulting from higher maize yields would trigger a large 
increase in government farm program payments. This could could offset much or all of the estimated decline in 
net farm income reported here. of the conventional RIN price reduces consumer costs from the mandate by an average of 600 
million dollars a year. Because every gallon sold receives the government tax credit ($0.12 
per litre for ethanol, $0.27 per litre for cellulosic ethanol and $0.26 per litre of bio-based 
diesel), as production increases the cost of the blenders credits to tax payers increases by 390 
million dollars. 
IMPROVING EXTRACTION RATES  
To simulate technology growth in the biofuel sector, two scenarios assume increased ethanol 
extraction rates from each ton of feedstocks. In one scenario, extraction rates for maize dry 
mill ethanol production were increased. In a separate scenario, the same percent growth in 
extraction rates was applied to all significant pathways for ethanol production
8. This covers 
maize dry mill and wet mill ethanol production as well as cellulosic ethanol from stover, 
switchgrass and other feedstocks. When ethanol extraction yields are not explicit in the 
model, production response to price signals were similarly adjusted as in the case of residual 
or other cellulosic ethanol production
9.  
 
In both scenarios, extraction yields were increased by 5% in 2011 and by an additional 1% a 
year until reaching 10% above the baseline yield in 2016, after which the change from 
baseline was held constant. In both technology scenarios, in the dry mill ethanol process 
where maize is the primary feedstock, the increase in extraction rates of ethanol required an 
offsetting volumetric decline in the production of distillers grains, the co-product in the 
process. In the second technology scenario wet milling, the secondary source of maize-based 
ethanol in the United States, an offsetting volumetric reduction was made in maize gluten 
feed and maize gluten meal production. For cellulosic ethanol from maize stover and from 
switchgrass, extraction rates were increased, but no offsetting reduction in the co-products 
were made as the left over co-product is expected to be primarily burnt to produce electricity 
at the plant. For other cellulosic ethanol production where feedstock quantities and yields are 
not explicit, an adjustment to the supply responsiveness to prices was made to approximate 
the assumed improvement in extraction rates. 
Improving dry-mill maize ethanol extraction rates 
                                                           
8 The technology employed by a small amount of ethanol production from non-maize cereals is left unchanged 
9 Other cellulosic ethanol is meant to represent disparate feedstocks such as sawdust, municipal solid waste and 
other proposed pathways. With improved productivity in the ethanol processing sector, ethanol production increases 
(Table 1b). The additional 4.3 billion litres of maize-based ethanol displaces other sources of 
ethanol production as well as imports with a small amount of additional exports occurring. 
Conventional ethanol prices as well as conventional RIN prices are both pushed lower but the 
prices of other classes of ethanol are largely unchanged as maize starch-based ethanol 
processes, of which dry mill extraction is one, are prohibited from fulfilling the other 
mandate categories. 
 
The increase in productivity means that the increase in ethanol production is possible even 
with a decline in the volume of maize processed (Table 1a). However, extracting more 
ethanol reduces production of distillers grains from each ton of maize and in aggregate. With 
less distillers grain available, the direct feed use of grain maize increases. This effect more 
than offsets the reduction in the amount of maize used for ethanol production, so overall 
maize demand increases slightly. This results in a very modest increase in maize prices, 
which in turn induces an increase in maize area at the expense of other crops.  
 
Higher maize prices have spillover effects on other markets, resulting in higher prices for a 
wide range of commodities. Improved crop prices drive farm income slightly higher. The 
lower conventional RIN price reduces the average consumer cost of complying with biofuel 
mandates by a stochastic average of 870 million dollars annually. The expanded biofuel 
production results in an additional 470 million dollars a year in additional government 
expenditures on biofuel tax credits given to biofuel blenders. Higher commodity prices add 
510 million to annual U.S. consumer food expenditures. 
Improving all maize and cellulosic ethanol extraction rates 
When the technology improvement is expanded to wet mill and cellulosic ethanol production, 
the improved extraction rates make cellulosic ethanol economically viable at an earlier stage 
and spurs production. The majority of the 9.7 billion gallon increase in ethanol production 
comes from cellulosic feedstocks (table 1b). While more widely expanding technology 
growth explains part of the difference in the two ethanol extraction rate scenarios, it is also 
heavily influenced by different treatment of maize and cellulosic ethanol in domestic policy.  
 Cellulosic ethanol production, unconstrained under the waived mandate, expands in all 
solutions and does not face the same inelastic portion of demand induced by a binding 
mandate that maize-based ethanol faces. Given this policy difference, despite extraction rate 
improvements in maize wet and dry mill ethanol production, growth in maize-based ethanol 
is actually smaller than when only dry mill ethanol extraction rates increase. The large 
increase in ethanol production pushes down retail prices, and limits the increase in maize-
based ethanol. Together they displace ethanol imports and increases exports. Crop prices rise 
modestly in this technology scenario as a result of increased area competition from 
switchgrass. Feed use of maize is drawn up through a loss of production of distillers grains 
and gluten feed and meal from improved extraction rates in the dry and wet mill ethanol 
process. Maize area is largely flat while there is an overall increase in major crop area, much 
of it coming from an expansion in switchgrass, one of the primary feedstocks in cellulosic 
ethanol production (table 1a).  
 
RIN prices fall for all ethanol categories, but because of the large increase in cellulosic 
ethanol production, the cost of the blenders credit to taxpayers increases as does the cost to 
motor-fuel consumers of the mandate. This occurs because the cellulosic biofuel mandate is 
assumed to be waived, and when it is waived, the cellulosic RIN price is essentially 
predetermined, and not dependent on production volumes. Net farm income and consumer 
expenditures both rise with higher commodity prices.  
SEPARATING ELASTIC AND INELASTIC SEGMENTS OF DEMAND 
Results in the two scenarios are consistent with expectations, but the average results over all 
500 solutions hide the different response behavior across the kinked demand curve. The 
stochastic results are spread across portions of biofuel and feedstock demand that are both 
elastic and inelastic. If we take a subset of the solutions at either end of the kinked demand 
curve the effects of growth in feedstock technology as well as improvements in biofuel 
processing can be more fully explored. A case could be made to sort the results based on 
petroleum prices, with the lowest petroleum prices corresponding to more binding mandates 
and high petroleum prices corresponding to the least, or non-binding mandates.  
 
If petroleum prices were the only factor in determining if the mandates are binding this 
analysis could be more easily accomplished by a comparative statics analysis with baseline, low and high petroleum prices. However, petroleum is only one of several factors 
determining where market demand for biofuels lies relative to mandates. Crop yields and 
foreign demand also play a significant role in this determination. To combine these effects we 
can return to the RIN price which, as previously discussed, is a direct measure of just how 
binding the mandate is. Taking the baseline results, all 500 solutions are sorted on the 
average conventional RIN value over the 2015 to 2019 period and 100 observations are 
selected at either end of the sort to represent the inelastic and elastic portions of demand.
10 
The 100 solutions in the baseline with the highest average conventional RIN values over 
2015 to 2019 represent the inelastic portion of the effective demand curve while the 100 
observations with the lowest average conventional RIN values over the 2015 to 2019 time 
period represent the more elastic segment of demand. Figure 5 shows the results of sorting on 
the conventional RIN values associated with the overall mandate and the average petroleum 
price. While there appears to be an inverse relationship between conventional RIN prices and 
petroleum prices, it is clear other factors make a significant contribution to RIN pricing. 
 
Table 2 shows the comparison of the 100 highest average conventional RIN price solutions in 
the baseline with those same observations under greater maize yield growth and increased 
ethanol extraction rates scenarios. The petroleum price draws in these solutions averaged 
$71.33 a barrel versus $93.53 for all 500 solutions and contributes to the binding nature of the 
mandate in this subset as does the average maize yield which is also lower than the overall 
average in these draws.
11 With the biofuel mandate relatively more binding in these solutions, 
the improvement in maize yields leads to a far more modest increase in maize ethanol 
production and maize prices are forced down along this inelastic portion of demand as the 
mandates set ethanol demand levels. Much of the technology gain is manifest in lower 
ethanol and RIN prices.  
 
The decline in the conventional RIN price is naturally larger than in the overall average given 
that the distribution of RIN prices is truncated at zero. Because of the inelasticity of demand 
                                                           
10 In the elastic portion of demand RIN prices are essentially driven to zero so the 2015 to 2019 averaging of the 
conventional RIN values is largely those observations where the overall mandate was not binding in each of the 
5 years. 
11 Given the approach used in constructing the stochastic draws, it is rare that five-year average crop yields will 
differ significantly from mean values, whereas an assumed autocorrelation process means that it is much more 
common for five-year average oil prices to differ significantly from mean values. In a given year, the inverse 
relationship between corn yields and RIN values would be stronger than these period averages suggest. from the binding mandate, the negative effect of improved crop yield on net farm income is 
greater than in the unsorted solution and it falls 3.25 billion dollars annually. Lower crop 
prices increase government CCC program costs and the modest expansion in biofuel 
production leads to a modest increase in government expenditures on blender’s credits. 
Consumers benefit to an even greater extent than before. Declines in consumer costs of the 
mandate as well total U.S. food expenditures are greater in the binding mandate case than in 
all 500 solutions.  
 
With an improvement in extraction rates in dry mill ethanol we also see a limited increase in 
ethanol produced from maize as the mandate still largely determines demand quantities. Little 
growth in maize ethanol output coupled with the extraction improvements means that the 
quantity of maize needed for processing actually falls, pushing down maize prices and 
modestly reducing net farm income. The improved extraction rates reduce overall processing 
costs but because they also increase the effective ethanol processing capacity, the average 
producer is not able to capture the benefits of the technology improvement. The 10% increase 
in extraction rates is an effective 10% increase in processing capacity. With a binding 
mandate, the effective increase in capacity with little increase in output demand leads to 
idling of capacity so early adopters in the processing sector are more likely to see benefits 
while late adopters see no benefits or must idle capacity. Consumer mandate costs fall by 
over 2 billion dollars annually as the conventional RIN value falls and the government’s 
expenditures on blenders credits are only slightly higher, linked to the modest increases in 
production.  
 
When extraction rates are applied to all maize and cellulosic processing systems, the maize-
based ethanol production has an even smaller response. A large increase in cellulosic ethanol 
production pushes down retail ethanol prices. Consumer mandate costs and government 
expenditures on blenders credits both rise substantially, tied to the large expansion in 
cellulosic ethanol production. When binding, the mandates place considerable constraint on 
growth in maize-based ethanol but don’t similarly constrain cellulosic ethanol when mandate 
are waived and allowance credits established.  
 In each of the technology growth scenarios, imports decline by a very modest amount. These 
imports are assumed to meet the gap in the RFS mandate between the advanced mandate and 
the bio-based diesel and cellulosic mandate levels. Under this assumption, imports change 
little because the cellulosic ethanol volume is spoken for in its own mandate while maize 
ethanol is not allowed, by legislative fiat, to be used towards the advanced biofuel mandate. 
The small change in imports then occurs when the overall mandate had been so binding that 
the ‘advanced’ biofuel imports were being used to fulfill the overall mandate. With 
technology growth in either maize yields or ethanol extraction rates the overage in advanced 
ethanol will be pushed out.    
    
Table 3 shows the comparison of the 100 lowest average conventional RIN price solutions 
over the same technology adoption scenarios.  With a zero average conventional RIN value in 
each of these 100 baseline solutions the overall mandate was not binding in any of the 
solutions. The average petroleum price in this subset of draws was $122.19 per barrel 
compared to the overall average of $93.53 per barrel. In this elastic portion of demand, an 
increase in maize yields quickly translates into increased maize ethanol production of 4.4 
billion litres annually. The more modest declines in crop prices results in more modest 
declines in farm income.  With a more elastic demand for maize in the biofuel market, the 
decline in U.S. food expenditures show a smaller decline at 3 billion dollars annually. 
Government expenditures on biofuel credits expand by 550 million dollars annual while costs 
to consumers from the mandate are largely unchanged.  
 
With the improvement in dry mill extraction rates along with mandates which are not 
binding, the increase in ethanol comes largely from maize-based ethanol. Production 
increases by over 7 billion litres a year actually pushing down cellulosic ethanol production 
slightly as the retail ethanol price declines. When both maize and cellulosic ethanol extraction 
rates increase in an unconstrained market, there is a large increase in maize and cellulosic 
ethanol production. In both cases some imports are squeezed out by additional domestic 
ethanol production. With the increased competition for land and the boost in crop prices, net 
farm income rises along with total U.S. food expenditures in both extraction rate scenarios.  
 When only dry mill ethanol extraction is increased, government biofuel credit expenditures 
rise along with increased maize-based ethanol production. Government mandate costs 
increase only slightly on a small additional amount of cellulosic ethanol production. With 
broader improvement in ethanol extraction rates, the large increase in cellulosic ethanol 
production drives up government credit expenditures along with consumer mandate cost. 
Increased feedstock use as well as land competition brought about by increased switchgrass 
area for cellulosic ethanol production drives up net farm income along with total U.S. food 
expenditure by over 1.3 billion dollars annually in this elastic segment of demand. 
 
The effect of maize technology adoption on commodity price movements show only modest 
differences between the baseline and the two sorts on conventional RIN prices, in part 
because low petroleum prices and below trend maize yields, both of which raise conventional 
RIN prices, have conflicting effects on maize prices. In other cases, the change may not be 
just the magnitude of the change from technology adoption but the direction of the change. 
When mandates are binding, technology reduces net farm income while on the opposite end 
of the demand curve, where mandates are not binding, increases in technology increase farm 
income.  
 
In all cases, improved maize yields increases maize production and reduces maize prices. 
However, when examining improvements in ethanol extraction technology, binding mandates 
reduce maize prices and production while in those cases where the mandate is not binding, 
maize prices and production rise. The effect of technology adoption on the feedstock sector is 
highly dependent on market context. The results of policy analysis in a deterministic 
framework are therefore highly dependent on the underlying baseline and provide results 
which may be misleading given the uncertainty about petroleum prices and other factors 
which influence how binding the mandates are likely to be. The implications for ethanol 
producers are similarly disparate. When mandates are binding, technological advance, be it in 
feedstocks or maize ethanol extraction rates, is quickly passed on to consumers. Cellulosic 
ethanol producers do not face a similar inelastic demand due to the specific features of U.S. 
biofuel policies. As a result, technology improvements increase production and the per-unit 
subsidies and consumer costs both rise proportionally.  
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION EXPERIENCE EU policy differs for that in the U.S. in a number of important respects. The most significant 
of these is that although there is an EU policy regarding the overall level of renewable energy 
consumption, member states are responsible for devising their own policies to meet the 
percentage targets. Therefore there are, and will continue to be, a variety of policy 
approaches taken across the EU member states.   
 
The overall EU policy is that 10 percent of transport energy in 2020 should come from 
renewable sources. Fuel from ‘second generation’ sources such as cellulosic ethanol count 
double towards the target while renewable energy used in electric cars is multiplied by a 
factor of 2.5. Despite pressure from a number of sources, including the EU parliament, a 
strict limit on ‘first generation’ biofuels was not imposed. There are a number of 
environmental and sustainability requirements which fuels must meet in order to count 
towards the target, but there are not the same restrictions on volumes by renewable fuel 
classification which appear in the U.S. biofuel mandates, at least not at the EU level. 
 
The impact of technology change will depend on the policy choices made by different 
member states. In general these policies have increasingly moved towards setting percentage 
targets in terms of volumes (in energy equivalents or otherwise) of biofuels in overall 
transport use. For some member states minimum targets are set for each biofuel, in others just 
an overall target is stipulated. An additional consideration is that there are also limits on the 
maximum blend rates of ethanol or biodiesel in fuel. Until now consumption of higher blend 
rates such as B-100 or E-85 have been limited to certain member states. 
 
Previous studies of the impact of alternative biofuel targets for the EU have generally 
assumed a specific volume of biofuel demand at the EU level and allocated that among the 
respective fuels, ethanol and biodiesel, in a fixed allocation (Al-Riffai et al., 2010, Banse et al., 
2010). In this representation when the targets are binding, the impact of changing technology 
in feedstock production or ethanol conversion would show results similar to the U.S. results 
under a binding mandate. So any technological improvement would potentially reduce 
incomes at the farm level in such a structure. However this representation could be overly 
restrictive given the less compartmentalized biofuel requirements in some member states. 
 EU demand is likely to be less elastic in the short run with respect to ethanol (and oil prices) 
even if ethanol is priced competitively with gasoline, as a smaller proportion of the fleet uses 
gasoline when compared to the U.S. and conversion to E-85 would likely be more costly, 
since it would involve additional changes in distribution infrastructure beyond simple 
increased blending rates for several EU member states. 
 
Alternatively, demand for ethanol in the EU could be more elastic than in the U.S. even 
where an overall 10 percent target is imposed and high level blends are rare. As the target is 
set in terms of a percentage of overall fuel use, technological improvements that would 
reduce the price of ethanol would increase both the total volume of fuel used and the 
proportion of fuel that came from gasoline and ethanol mixes. Given the inelastic nature of 
total fuel demand and the small proportion from renewable fuels this impact is likely to be 
small. However, if member states choose not to set individual targets for each fuel or 
feedstock, this would add demand elasticity to the ethanol market. In this instance, changes in 
cereal yields or ethanol extraction rates could have impacts similar to the case where 
mandates are not binding in the U.S., with ethanol price reductions potentially increasing 
market share of overall biofuels from ethanol, at least up to the blend wall. For the EU this 
shift would occur at the expense of other renewable feedstocks and fuels and could involve 
displacing cellulosic ethanol, biodiesel or electricity and would result in a larger reduction in 
costs associated with meeting the 10 percent target than more restrictive biofuel share 
schemes. 
 
The different member state biofuel policies are likely to continue to evolve, influenced by the 
costs of the various biofuels, their perceived impact on the environment, and the impact of 
their consumption on their feedstock markets. With no specific allocation of biofuel shares at 
the EU level and varying member state policies, the representation of EU biofuel policies 
where feedstocks or even fuels are rigidly allocated to meet targets is likely to overstate the 
inelasticity of demand for the various biofuels. For example, in the UK, the “Renewable 
Transport Fuel Obligation (RTFO)” sets a proportion of fuel that must come from biofuels, 
but suppliers are free to choose which biofuel to use. However, the restriction that blends 
cannot be higher than 5 percent biofuel means that in practice, as the overall obligation rises, 
the potential to substitute biofuels falls (UK Department for Transport, 2005). CONCLUSION 
In general, increasing maize yields result in lower crop prices and additional ethanol 
production with much of the benefit flowing to consumers of maize, while growth in ethanol 
extraction rates results in higher crop prices and significantly larger ethanol production with 
feedstock producers and ethanol processors deriving much of the benefit. Using a stochastic 
model of U.S. agriculture and biofuels sector it can be shown that the blending mandates 
under the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 reduce demand elasticity in both 
the maize markets and wholesale ethanol markets when they are binding. This potential 
inelasticity recalls Cochrane’s treadmill and the effects of technology adoption on 
agricultural markets and producer consolidation. 
 
These results, however, are highly dependent on the whether the overall biofuel volumetric 
mandate is binding. When mandates are more binding and conventional RIN prices higher, 
increasing maize yields result in much smaller increases in ethanol production than when the 
mandates are not determining ethanol blended quantities. The same is true for increasing 
extraction rates. When mandates are binding, increasing extraction rates do not have a 
substantive effect on maize-based ethanol production and actually reduce feedstock demand 
as the quantity of feedstocks needed to meet the mandated quantities falls.  
 
When mandates are not binding and RIN prices are low, improved ethanol extraction rates 
lead to substantial increases in maize-based and cellulosic ethanol and the demand for 
feedstocks to fuel the process. There is also additional competition for land as dedicated 
crops such as switchgrass are drawn into production. Mandates are more likely to be binding 
when oil prices are low or maize yields are below trend.  When mandates are binding, the 
benefits of introduction of technology in either the maize market or the ethanol processing 
market largely flow to food, feed and transportation fuel consumers.  
 
Given the effect of U.S. biofuel policy, market context relative to binding mandates is 
critically important in understanding the winners and losers from technology adoption. In 
some cases, it isn’t just a matter of the magnitude of the effects, but even the direction in 
which important variables move in response to the change. This study further underlines the 
importance that the baseline in deterministic modeling efforts can have on subsequent policy analysis. This highlights the advantages of a stochastic approach when markets are 
characterized by non-linear behavior and asymmetric policies. 
  
The EU chose not to constrain the mix of renewable energy required to meet its target for the 
contribution to transport fuel. This may increase the ability of a given fuel to increase its 
market share as a result of technological improvements and therefore allows some of the 
benefits of these improvements to be passed back to the producers of the required feedstocks. 
However, many member states have opted to implement their own policies to specify 
blending level for biodiesel and ethanol, with some even specifying targets for particular 
feedstocks. Furthermore, technical restrictions on blend rates and feedstocks also restrict the 
flexibility of a member state’s policy options. Where this is the case, the policy operates more 
in line with that of the U.S. where the mandates are binding.  Our analysis suggests that the 
proper representation in the modeling system of  of the policy instruments that are in place in 
Europe is important when considering issues such as the impact of technological 
advancement on agricultural or biofuel markets and the actors therein. 
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   Table 1a: Average of 500 stochastic model solutions, years 2015 to 2019, crops market 
 





Area Planted (Million hectares)
   Maize 37.11 -0.48 0.10 0.02
   Soybeans 31.19 0.12 0.02 0.06
   Wheat 21.59 -0.22 -0.01 -0.15
   Switchgrass 0.54 0.00 -0.02 0.98
Major crops 127.15 -0.63 0.07 0.70
CRP 11.96 0.22 -0.04 -0.06
Major crops and CRP 139.11 -0.41 0.03 0.64
Yield (Metric tons/hectare)
   Maize 10.98 0.87 0.00 0.00
   Soybeans 3.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
   Wheat 3.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Maize market (Million metric tons)
   Production 375.45 24.50 1.13 0.34
   Feed and residual use 137.95 7.40 4.36 5.48
   Fuel alcohol use 145.31 6.62 -2.81 -5.07
   Exports 58.13 9.28 -0.41 -0.06
Distillers grains production 40.82 1.84 -5.01 -5.75
Other crop production (Million metric tons)
   Soybeans 93.95 0.27 0.09 0.24
   Wheat 56.74 -0.67 -0.03 -0.39
Crop prices (Dollars/metric ton)
   Maize 156.54 -17.61 1.40 1.25
   Soybeans 373.28 -12.01 3.60 5.74
   Wheat 188.71 -12.16 1.20 1.97
2010 FAPRI Stochastic 
Baseline
Change from: Improved 
growth in maize yields
Change from: Improved 
extraction rates in ethanol 
September-August 
year 2015-2019  
Table 1b: Average of 500 stochastic model solutions, years 2015 to 2019, biofuels market 
and aggregates 
 






  Petroleum, refiners acquis. 93.53 0.00 0.00 0.00
Yield (Metric tons/hectare)
   Maize 10.98 0.87 0.00 0.00
Maize market (Million metric tons)
   Production 375.45 24.50 1.13 0.34
   Feed and residual use 137.95 7.40 4.36 5.48
   Fuel alcohol use 145.31 6.62 -2.81 -5.07
   Exports 58.13 9.28 -0.41 -0.06
Crop prices (Dollars/metric ton)
   Maize 156.54 -17.61 1.40 1.25
   Soybeans 373.28 -12.01 3.60 5.74
   Wheat 188.71 -12.16 1.20 1.97
Ethanol supply and use (Million liters)
  Production  67734 3080 4146 9672
     From maize 61683 2819 4353 3687
     Other conventional 1417 53 -94 -123
     Cellulosic 4634 208 -113 6107
  Imports (ethyl alcohol) 7440 -102 -78 -253
  Domestic disappearance 74595 2881 3990 9186
  Exports (ethyl alcohol) 417 58 61 118
Ending stocks 3879 169 223 506
Ethanol prices (Dollars per liter)
  Conventional rack, Omaha 0.53 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
  Cellulosic rack 0.89 0.00 0.00 -0.01
  Other advanced rack 0.64 0.00 0.00 -0.01
  Effective retail 0.56 -0.01 0.00 -0.01
RIN values
  Conventional ethanol 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
  Advanced ethanol 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.01
  Cellulosic ethanol 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
Aggregate measures (Billion dollars)
Net farm income 79.90 -2.74 0.52 0.64
Net CCC outlays 10.02 0.16 -0.02 -0.03
RFS consumer mandate cost 4.82 -0.60 -0.87 1.12
Gov. biofuel credit expend. 10.78 0.39 0.47 2.03
Total US food expenditures 1510.20 -3.12 0.51 0.79
2010 FAPRI Stochastic 
Baseline
Change from: Improved 
growth in maize yields
Change from: Improved 
extraction rates in ethanol 
September-August 
year 2015-2019  
Table 2: Average of 100 stochastic model solutions with highest baseline conventional RIN 
values, years 2015 to 2019 






  Petroleum, refiners acquis. 71.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
Yield (Metric tons/hectare)
   Maize 10.86 0.87 0.00 0.00
Maize market (Million metric tons)
   Production 367.05 21.97 -2.48 -3.14
   Feed and residual use 140.98 8.52 5.47 6.28
   Fuel alcohol use 132.09 2.10 -9.05 -10.55
   Exports 59.53 9.98 0.99 1.18
Crop prices (Dollars/metric ton)
   Maize 153.37 -19.22 -1.63 -1.12
   Soybeans 371.93 -13.78 0.18 3.08
   Wheat 185.90 -13.45 -1.28 0.11
Ethanol supply and use (Million liters)
  Production  64323 1334 876 9041
     From maize 56067 892 938 577
     Other conventional 1289 8 -141 -161
     Cellulosic 6966 433 79 8624
  Imports (ethyl alcohol) 7893 -103 -92 -318
  Domestic disappearance 71688 1133 699 8490
  Exports (ethyl alcohol) 357 82 91 105
Ending stocks 3735 93 75 485
Ethanol prices (Dollars per liter)
  Conventional rack, Omaha 0.50 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
  Cellulosic rack 0.91 0.00 0.00 -0.01
  Other advanced rack 0.59 0.00 0.00 -0.01
  Effective retail 0.48 0.00 0.00 -0.01
RIN values
  Conventional ethanol 0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02
  Advanced ethanol 0.18 0.00 0.00 0.01
  Cellulosic ethanol 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00
Aggregate measures (Billion dollars)
Net farm income 81.42 -3.25 -0.44 -0.15
Net CCC outlays 10.04 0.19 0.02 0.00
RFS consumer mandate cost 9.75 -1.52 -2.17 1.73
Gov. biofuel credit expend. 10.71 0.21 0.10 2.33
Total US food expenditures 1482.72 -3.37 -0.06 0.30




Change from: Improved 
growth in maize yields
Change from: Improved 
extraction rates in ethanol  
Table 3: Average of 100 stochastic model solutions with lowest baseline conventional RIN 
values, years 2015 to 2019 
 
   






  Petroleum, refiners acquis. 122.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
Yield (Metric tons/hectare)
   Maize 11.09 0.87 0.01 0.01
Maize market (Million metric tons)
   Production 391.15 27.11 4.17 3.58
   Feed and residual use 132.32 6.70 3.78 4.96
   Fuel alcohol use 170.64 10.37 2.19 0.04
   Exports 54.06 9.01 -1.67 -1.32
Crop prices (Dollars/metric ton)
   Maize 165.38 -16.70 4.18 3.87
   Soybeans 383.31 -10.77 6.84 8.68
   Wheat 197.47 -11.40 3.42 3.98
Ethanol supply and use (Million liters)
  Production  78027 4579 7298 11263
     From maize 72452 4417 7670 7138
     Other conventional 1625 90 -65 -97
     Cellulosic 3950 72 -307 4221
  Imports (ethyl alcohol) 6876 -109 -66 -202
  Domestic disappearance 84205 4368 7132 10799
  Exports (ethyl alcohol) 454 40 56 142
Ending stocks 4341 235 372 578
Ethanol prices (Dollars per liter)
  Conventional rack, Omaha 0.59 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
  Cellulosic rack 0.88 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
  Other advanced rack 0.69 0.00 -0.01 -0.01
  Effective retail 0.64 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
RIN values
  Conventional ethanol 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  Advanced ethanol 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.01
  Cellulosic ethanol 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
Aggregate measures (Billion dollars)
Net farm income 81.72 -2.40 1.38 1.45
Net CCC outlays 9.85 0.13 -0.05 -0.05
RFS consumer mandate cost 2.18 0.07 0.00 0.82
Gov. biofuel credit expend. 11.93 0.55 0.81 1.94
Total US food expenditures 1536.52 -3.00 1.04 1.34
Change from: Improved 
extraction rates in ethanol 
September-August 
year 2015-2019 
2010 FAPRI Stochastic 
Baseline
Change from: Improved 
growth in maize yields 






Figure 2: The influence of biofuel mandates on the market effects of 1) technology adoption 
in maize production 2) technology adoption in ethanol processing. 
 
 





















Figure 3: The influence of biofuel mandates on the market effects technology adoption in 
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